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A framework for conceptualizing and assessing the resilience of essential
services produced by socio-technical systems
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ABSTRACT. Essential services such as electricity are critical to human well-being and the functioning of modern society. These services
are produced by complex adaptive socio-technical systems and emerge from the interplay of technical infrastructure with people and
governing institutions. Ongoing global changes such as urbanization and increasing prevalence of extreme weather events are generating
much interest in strategies for building the resilience of essential services. However, much of the emphasis has been on reliable and
resilient technical infrastructure. This focus is insufficient; resilience also needs to be built into the human and institutional processes
within which these technical systems are embedded. Here, we propose a conceptual framework, based on a complex adaptive systems
perspective, that identifies four key domains that require investment to build the resilience of essential services. This framework addresses
both the technical and social components of the socio-technical systems that underlie essential services and incorporates specified and
general resilience considerations. The framework can be used to guide resilience assessments and to identify strategies for building
resilience across different organizational levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern society depends on a wide range of services being resilient
in the face of disruption and rapid global change (Holling 2001,
UNISDR 2015). These services include ecosystem services
produced by social-ecological systems, as well as technologically
mediated essential services such as electricity, water, and
sanitation. Similar to ecosystem services, disruption in essential
services can cause ripple effects, with considerable social
consequence (Schulman et al. 2004, Rose et al. 2007, Pescaroli
and Alexander 2015), and can escalate to disaster if  it exceeds the
ability of the affected community to cope (UNISDR 2009, 2015).
Along with efforts to foster resilience of ecosystem services,
building resilience of essential services is critically needed (La
Porte 2006), accompanied by practical frameworks and
approaches to better understand and assess the resilience of such
services.  
Essential services are produced by complex adaptive socio-
technical systems (Varga 2015), which are embedded within
broader social-ecological systems (Folke 2006, STAP 2015).
Essential services are coproduced through the interplay of
technology and social institutions, or hard and soft infrastructure,
that compose socio-technical systems. Hard infrastructure refers
to physical technical assets and systems, whereas soft
infrastructure refers to social systems such as institutions, users,
rules, and regulations (UNESCAP 2013). Most of the current
resilience emphasis around essential services focuses on
development, maintenance, and protection of the hard
infrastructure, rather than assurance of the service itself
(Auerswald et al. 2006, La Porte 2006). Investments in hard
infrastructure ought to be accompanied by investments in soft
infrastructure to ensure resilient service delivery. In the emergency
preparedness and disaster management communities, it is
increasingly recognized that continuity of essential services
requires a focus on the broad-based resilience capabilities of
communities, the private sector, and all levels of government
(DHS 2010, NIAC 2010, FEMA 2015).  
Ensuring the resilience of electricity supply is of particular
interest to government administrators (Grid Resiliency Task
Force 2012, Executive Office of the President 2013, City of New
York 2013, NAS 2017). Electricity supply is considered a
foundational service because many other layers of critical
infrastructure and the essential services derived from them (such
as water supply) depend on electricity (Koester and Cohen 2012,
Jeschonnek et al. 2016). Like the socio-technical systems that
produce other essential services, the electricity supply system is a
complex adaptive system susceptible to disruption (Amin 2015).
To ensure resilience, the interlinked social and technical parts of
the system continuously have to rebound from, adapt to, and
transform amid the many environmental, technical, and social
risks factors that can disrupt supply.  
In common usage, resilience refers to the ability to bounce back
or spring back into shape following a disruption. As a systems-
level characteristic, resilience is an emergent property of complex
adaptive systems (Cork 2011, Aldunce et al. 2015) and refers to
the capacity of a system to sustain core functions in the face of
disruption and change (Folke et al. 2010, Biggs et al. 2012).
Resilience can be used in either a descriptive or a normative sense.
From a descriptive perspective, the concept is neutral and refers
to the persistence of the core functions and identity of a system
(Walker et al. 2004, Cumming et al. 2005), which can be either
desirable or undesirable. Examples of undesirable resilient
systems include poverty traps and organized crime (Barrett and
Constas 2014, Dahlberg 2015). More recently, there has been a
groundswell of interest in the normative use of resilience as an
approach for managing complex adaptive systems toward
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desirable outcomes (Biggs et al. 2012, Seville et al. 2015, Folke
2016). From a normative perspective, resilience is not merely the
ability to sustain core functions, but to sustain specific outcomes
such as continued production of specific ecosystem (Biggs et al.
2015, Folke et al. 2016) or essential services. This ability may entail
bouncing back after a disruption, but could also involve systemic
transformation and bouncing forward to a position better than
before (Boin and Van Eeten 2013, Weichselgartner and Kelman
2015).  
Here, we propose a framework to conceptualize and assess the
resilience of essential services using a complex adaptive systems
perspective. For our purposes, we apply resilience normatively
and define resilience of essential services as the capacity of
complex adaptive socio-technical systems to sustain the
production of essential services in the face of disruption and
ongoing social, technological, and environmental change. The
framework we propose draws on and integrates work on resilience
from several different disciplinary traditions, particularly work
on social-ecological systems (Biggs et al. 2015, Folke et al. 2016),
research on the resilience of engineered systems (Madni and
Jackson 2009, Park et al. 2013), and organizational resilience
(Weick et al. 1999, Linnenluecke and Griffiths 2012), as well as
practical policy guidance that focuses on critical social responses
from community resilience (Cabinet Office 2011, NIST 2016a).
We integrate these different strands of work based on a common
underlying view of these problems as complex adaptive systems
problems.  
The framework we propose draws on an interdisciplinary
synthesis of literature, as well as practical experience of
conducting resilience assessments to electricity supply in Eskom
Holdings, the South African national electrical utility. The South
African experience is emblematic of the challenges facing electric
utility providers, particularly in developing countries. By focusing
on a clearly defined system, we aim to explore how the resilience
of essential services that underpin key functions in modern
societies can be enhanced. We suggest that this framework can be
applied to other essential services and, with some modification,
can also advance the understanding of social-ecological resilience
more generally.
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE
SYSTEMS PROBLEM: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA
Globally, electricity supply systems face an increase in the number
and severity of large-scale emergencies, often triggered by severe
weather (Abi-Samra et al. 2014, Cabinet Office 2015). In emerging
economies, this trend is aggravated by rapid growth in electricity
demand, posing challenges for reliable service provision and
constraining opportunities for social and economic development
(Bocca and Mehlum 2012). In the case of South Africa, 95% of
the electricity used in the country is supplied by Eskom, a national
vertically integrated generation, transmission, and distribution
utility (Eskom 2016a). In a relatively short period of time, Eskom
went from global power company of the year in 2001 (Khoza and
Adam 2006) to no longer being able to maintain the national
supply-demand balance in 2008, resulting in three weeks of
nationwide rotational load shedding to deal with the shortfall
(Chettiar et al. 2009). By 2014, the South African energy profile
became comparable to that of China, India, and Mexico at the
time, where energy shortfalls significantly constrain economic
growth to meet human development needs (Bocca and Mehlum
2012).  
Eskom initiated a resilience strategy in 2008 in response to
growing electricity shortfalls and to deal with the new reality of
regular loadshedding. Initially, the focus was only on power
system resilience, but it expanded to the whole enterprise in 2013
to deal with wider business risks that were emerging. The purpose
of a resilience focus is to prepare the organization to deal with
business unusual. The expanded enterprise resilience focus is to
ensure an integrated overview of risks and to facilitate an
integrated emergency response capability to deal with systems-
level emergencies and special events such as the FIFA World Cup
and national elections (Koch et al. 2013). There is a realization
that traditional reductionist approaches, widely used to manage
technology in the organization, are inadequate to deal with the
complexity of emerging systemic problems (Guckenheimer and
Ottino 2008), particularly the low-probability high-consequence
risk of blackouts that Eskom has to manage.  
The dynamics of complex adaptive power systems cause the
systems to drift toward a critical point at which their apparent
stability can abruptly change state (Dobson et al. 2007, Viejo et
al. 2015). The complex intertwining of unforeseeable coincidences
may cause rapidly cascading failure in the power system, and, in
the worst case, results in a blackout (Bo et al. 2015), i.e., a wide-
area outage of long duration (NAS 2017). A blackout, in turn,
normally results in further cascading failure across other
interconnected and interdependent infrastructures such as water
or telecommunications (Rinaldi et al. 2001, Mukhopadhyay and
Hastak 2016). Widespread blackouts are low-probability high-
consequence events that often result in significant social and
economic impact (Bo et al. 2015). In most developed nations with
their highly interconnected grids, a blackout is rapidly restored
through interconnections from neighboring areas that still have
power (Bo et al. 2015). However, in the case of a national blackout,
none of Eskom’s neighboring electricity utilities have the capacity
to restart the South African power system, which highlights the
importance of resilience in general, and a black-start capability
in particular. However, a well-developed technical black-start
plan is insufficient to ensure national resilience to a blackout
incident; institutional arrangements and integrated response
plans are required in partnership with priority national role
players (such as fuel, water, telecommunications, and security) to
effectively respond to, and deal with, the consequences of a
national blackout.  
Given the described situation, it is clear that a fundamental,
deliberate, and transformative change is required within and
among institutions at national, regional, and local levels to
establish the necessary preparedness across multiple sectors. We
draw on the emerging body of work on complex systems problems
(Cilliers 2000, Westley et al. 2006, Allenby and Sarewitz 2011)
that indicates that such transformative change can be facilitated
by recognizing that problems such as sustaining electricity supply
in the face of disruption and change are fundamentally complex,
rather than mere technical problems. Contingency planning and
response strategies need to be implemented. The capacity to
prepare and respond in a coordinated fashion requires complex
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Table 1. The difference between complicated and complex adaptive systems and problems, adapted from Poli (2013).
 
Feature Complicated problems Complex problems
Boundary Level 1 Level 2 (as defined by Allenby and Sarewitz 2011)
Causality Complicated problems originate
from causes that can be
individually distinguished
Complex problems and systems result from networks of multiple interacting causes that
cannot be individually distinguished
Reduction Problems can be addressed piece
by piece
Problems must be addressed as entire systems, that is, they cannot be addressed in a
piecemeal way
Linearity For each input to the system there
is a proportionate output
Small inputs may result in disproportionate effects
Solvability These problems admit permanent
solutions
These problems cannot be solved in full, but require systematic management. Typically, any
intervention merges into new problems as a result of the interventions dealing with them
(Poli 2013)
Controllability The relevant systems can be
controlled
The relevant systems cannot be controlled; the best one can do is to influence them. These
problems have to be engaged directly; one must learn to “dance with them” (Meadows
2009:70, Poli 2013)
adaptive systems thinking (Cilliers 2007, Bohensky et al. 2015),
which emphasizes the presence of the interlinked nature of
technical and human systems, their processes of interaction, and
their tendency to self-organize into different regimes or result in
disorder associated with critical stability points (Holling et al.
2002, Folke 2006).  
The difference between complicated and complex adaptive
systems and problems is a difference of type, not of degree (Poli
2013). It is necessary to draw a clear distinction between these
types of problems because the methods and approaches for
understanding and managing them differ vastly (Snowden and
Boone 2007, Poli 2013; Table 1). Reductionist approaches rely on
problem-solving strategies that delimit reality into smaller parts
and apply methodologies that aim toward predictability and
control (Ramalingam et al. 2008). Such approaches assume that
the nature of the problem is complicated. Reductionist
approaches are inadequate to address complex problems.
Complex problems require ongoing engagement and adaptation
because apparent solutions often give rise to new problems (Poli
2013). Complex adaptive systems thinking explicitly considers
unintended consequences, the agency of people, and
unpredictable novelty (Juarrero 1999, Kurtz and Snowden 2003,
Allenby and Sarewitz 2011). In reality, most problem situations
contain both complicated and complex phenomena. It is essential
for decision makers to make sense of the problem composition
so as to apply solutions compatible with the nature of the problem
at hand (Snowden and Boone 2007).  
The system boundaries described by Allenby and Sarewitz (2011)
are a useful guide to distinguishing between complicated and
complex problems in socio-technical systems. Level 1 system
boundaries are defined in terms of specific technological solutions
such as electrical transformers or switchgear that aim to address
a particular problem. Level 1 problems generally correspond to
complicated problems that focus on hard infrastructure. However,
for level 1 solutions to function, they are always embedded in level
2 systems, which incorporate the wider psychological, social, and
cultural contexts that are inseparable from the technology
(Allenby and Sarewitz 2011). Level 2 systems are complex
adaptive systems that are susceptible to nonlinear risks and
catastrophic disruption. Technical components in the power
system are typically analyzed at level 1, whereas the overall
electricity supply system should be recognized as a level 2 complex
adaptive socio-technical system. The different types of problems
described in Table 1 are thus correlated with boundary definition.  
Eskom recognizes resilience as a strategic imperative (Eskom
2016a). By design, Eskom has multiple layers of defence to prevent
a blackout, which are actively maintained to ensure their integrity.
Even though the probability of such high-consequence events is
low, Eskom is committed to establishing response preparedness
and employing risk reduction measures to reduce the fallout from
such eventualities (Eskom 2016b).
RESILIENCE THINKING
Resilience thinking is an application of complex adaptive systems
thinking that pays specific attention to enhancing resilience.
Building resilience has arisen as a response to deal with
uncertainty and external risk, limited control, deep disruption,
and an unpredictable future (DuPlessis VanBreda 2001, Sheffi
2005, Bhamra et al. 2011, Caldwell 2014). Resilience refers to the
innate ability of complex adaptive systems to absorb disturbances
or surprise and to adapt to dynamic change without losing their
identity or function (Folke et al. 2002, Walker et al. 2004, Berkes
2007). The concept of resilience therefore includes interrelated
aspects of persistence, adaptability, and transformability (Walker
et al. 2004, Folke et al. 2010). Following this line of thinking, we
define a resilient socio-technical electricity supply system from a
normative perspective as one that has the emergent capability to
absorb large shocks, even for low-probability high-consequence
events such as a national blackout, and to continue to adapt amid
ongoing changes such as climate change and urbanization while
continuing to ensure reliable electricity supply in an affordable
and sustainable manner.  
Literature on the application of resilience distinguishes between
two different types of resilience that need to be established
simultaneously: specified and general resilience (Folke et al. 2010,
O’Connell et al. 2015a). Specified resilience refers to the resilience
of a specified part of the system to identified disruptions, whereas
general resilience refers to the capacity of a system to withstand
all hazards, including novel and unforeseen ones, while continuing
to provide essential functions (Walker et al. 2009; Table 2).
General resilience is a generic capability to cope with uncertainty
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Table 2. Characteristics of specified and general resilience.
 
Characteristic Specified resilience General resilience
How to identify
it
The ability to persist within a stability zone (Folke et al. 2010)
through anticipation strategies, being prepared, and applying
prevention (Comfort et al. 2001)
An intangible emergent capacity for adaptation and transformation
(Folke et al. 2010) across multiple equilibria (North 1993, Caldwell
2014)
How to build it Can be established by following best practice, through
managing foreseeable risks (Garred 2013), and by how
infrastructure is designed, built, and maintained (NIAC 2010)
Is nurtured through the capacity for abductive thinking and sense
making (Grøtan 2013) and evolutionary self-organization (Allan and
Bryant 2014, Scolobig et al. 2015, De Coning 2016)
How to sustain
it
Employs single-loop learning and aims to strengthen negative
feedback loops (Antonacopoulou and Chiva, unpublished
manuscript†): to return conditions toward a predetermined
target, to remove deviations, and to keep operations within
deterministic boundaries (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007)
Employs double-loop learning and aims to strengthen positive
feedback loops (Antonacopoulou and Chiva, unpublished
manuscript†): to self-reinforce, amplify, enhance, and stimulate
behaviors that enhance resilience, which includes modifying the rules
that drive behavior (Holman 2010)
†https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/conf/olkc/archive/oklc6/papers/antonacopoulou__chiva.pdf
and surprise and to endure novelty and instability, including
multiple shocks and cascading failure (Folke et al. 2010, Walker
and Salt 2012). General resilience emerges when predetermined
plans are inadequate to deal with the situation at hand, and new
capabilities are dynamically developed to respond (Lee et al.
2013). Resilience literature cautions that resilience investments
have to be balanced across specified and general resilience because
effort channeled into developing only one kind of resilience may
reduce the other kind (Folke et al. 2010, Resilience Alliance 2010,
Cork 2011).  
Here, we apply the bifocal lens of complicated and complex
problems to clarify the operational implications for building
specified and general resilience. To establish specified resilience,
decomposition of the system and its environment is required to
determine “what” internal parts should be resilient, and against
“what” external aspects of the environment this resilience is
required (Carpenter et al. 2001). Although this reductionist
approach is pragmatic, it employs a complicated approach to a
complex system. Resilience associated with technical components
can be engineered in a complicated fashion using classical
reliability-oriented design (Holling 1996). Experts can follow best
practice or good practice (Hummelbrunner and Jones 2013a) to
establish resilience of specific parts of the system to specified
shocks. However, these level 1 components can collapse when
critical thresholds are exceeded in the level 2 systems context in
which they are embedded (Pourbeik et al. 2006, Simone 2014).
General resilience therefore needs to be established across
multiple facets of the level 2 system and necessitates resilience
practitioners to embrace complexity-based approaches.  
A key capability that enables leaders to make sense of inherent
complexity and ambiguity is sensemaking (Weick 1995), i.e., the
ability to comprehend, understand, and explain what is going on
(Ancona 2012). Sensemaking is an integral part of learning and
consists of an ongoing action-oriented cycle of acquisition,
reflection, and action that people go through to integrate
experiences into their understanding of the world to inform action
(Kolko 2010). Sensemaking shapes organizational behavior, i.e.,
how the organization makes sense of where it is and what is going
on, and directly affects how the agents in the system adapt and
self-organize, which, in turn, influences how the system develops
(Weick 1995). Appropriate collective sensemaking is crucial to
ensure resilient service delivery because it directly affects general
resilience features through the effectiveness of organizational
response to crisis or disruption (Casto 2014).
Resilience assessment
Along with the rapid rise in interest in fostering resilience, there
has been great demand for improved approaches to assess
resilience (Quinlan et al. 2015). Assessments can be distinguished
based on purpose (why), target audience (for whom), level of
assessment (of whom), and object of assessment (what; Terenzini
1989, Carpenter et al. 2001, Quinlan et al. 2015). Many different
resilience assessment methods exist. Several approaches highlight
the need for participatory approaches (Almedom et al. 2007,
Pasteur 2011, O’Connell et al. 2015b, Quinlan et al. 2015). Other
resilience assessment approaches distinguish between types of
resilience, an evaluation of the actual resilience displayed in past
incidents, or comprise indicators of adaptive management,
adaptive governance, or transformative capacity (Cork 2011,
Walker and Salt 2012, O’Connell et al. 2015a). A stated objective
of many resilience assessments is to understand how to build
resilience of some desired outcome.  
Drawing on the literature from educational assessments, we
distinguish between “summative assessments” that primarily aim
to evaluate current levels of resilience for external reporting and
benchmarking, and “formative assessments” that aim to build
resilience through the assessment process itself  (Table 3).
Although these two objectives are not mutually exclusive,
clarification of the primary purpose of a particular resilience
assessment exercise can help in selecting a suitable approach.
Summative assessments seek to standardize indicators for the
benefit of comparison and to aggregate toward national or
regional reporting of resilience (Stephenson 2010, O’Connell et
al. 2015a, RESILENS 2016). Formative assessments comprise an
ongoing process, not a periodic product (Black et al. 2003, Nicol
and Macfarlane-Dick 2006). Such assessments entail a systematic
and ongoing internal process of seeking and interpreting
evidence, to participatively make sense of the current levels of
system resilience, and to garner agreement to improve attainment
of resilience outcomes. Formative assessments center on critical
conversations among key actors in the system to enable collective
sensemaking, promote commitment to resilience goals, and
adaptively stimulate the emergence of resilience throughout the
system. Care should be taken that the approach used does not
undermine the intended outcome. When assessments for
Ecology and Society 23(2): 12
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss2/art12/
Table 3. Differentiation between formative and summative resilience assessments.
 
Formative resilience assessment Summative resilience assessment
Can be an ongoing process Can be scheduled periodically
“For” a resilience outcome “Of” resilience
To facilitate a bottom-up dialogue among actors in the system Against standardized indicators decided top-down
To diagnose where the system is in its levels of resilience For the purpose of producing a report for a third party
To agree where resilience should be strengthened To give an account of what has been achieved
Through collective action toward shared resilience goals For comparison, aggregation, or benchmarking
enhancing resilience are conducted as punitive compliance audits,
it can lead to unintended consequences and erode resilience
instead of building it (Dekker and Breakey 2016).  
Formative resilience assessment processes merge into a
transformative assess-and-build cycle. Such assessments require
direct engagement with the complex adaptive system to learn
about the nature of the complex dynamics (Quinlan et al. 2015).
Key actors probe the system interactively to make sense of
dynamically changing feedback mechanisms, constraints, and
patterns of emergence (Juarrero 1999, Walker and Salt 2006).
Attention is paid to: what builds, maintains, and breaks down
resilience; where undesirable resilience should be disrupted; and
where desirable resilience can be enhanced (Cork 2009, Quinlan
et al. 2015). The assessor is part of the complex adaptive system,
and probing can affect emergence of the system in unpredictable
ways. Therefore, all probes should be carefully designed as
interventions to enhance resilience (Holman 2010), and every
intervention to build resilience can be used as a probe to better
understand the system and its resilience dynamics. This ongoing
process can adaptively transform the system’s resilience over time.
A FRAMEWORK FOR CONCEPTUALIZING THE
RESILIENCE OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES
Building on the emerging theoretical ideas outlined above, of
resilience as the emergent outcome of complex adaptive systems,
and practical experiences in operationalizing resilience thinking
and assessments in the context of electricity supply in South
Africa, we present a framework for conceptualizing different
aspects of resilience in complex adaptive socio-technical systems.
To conceptualize the resilience of essential services, we juxtapose
the types of resilience (specified and general) and focus of
resilience investment (technology or social; Fig. 1). Although the
social and technical components are interdependent, the
distinction here is based on the content (Rosen 2000) and the focus
of the resilience strategy (NIAC 2010). The resulting four
quadrants represent different resilience domains that can serve as
a guide for how to assess and build resilience of essential services:  
. The “specified technical resilience” quadrant represents
areas where resilience to specific risks (e.g., storms) is built
into technical infrastructure to ensure that it is adequate,
reliable, and secure. This quadrant focuses on building
robustness into level 1 systems. 
. The “specified social resilience” quadrant represents areas
where resilience to specific risks (e.g., disruption to critical
business processes) is established through processes and
institutions in the social domain. This quadrant focuses on
building specific skills, response capabilities, and plans
within level 2 systems. 
. The “general technical resilience” quadrant represents areas
where resilience to novel and unknown risks is established
through network topology or adaptive technologies that
offer systems-level flexibility to enable an agile response
across the system in dealing with uncertainty. This quadrant
focuses on connectivity and structure of level 2 systems to
ensure systems-level flexibility. 
. The “general social resilience” quadrant represents areas
where resilience to novel and unknown risks is established
through people, processes, and institutions. This quadrant
focuses on collective human agency, agility, and volition in
level 2 systems. 
Fig. 1. A conceptual framework for building and assessing
resilience of essential services produced by socio-technical
systems.
Differentiated resilience roles
These different forms of resilience can be cultivated at different
organizational levels (operational, tactical, and strategic). The
organization has been conceptualized as a layered triangle, with
the operations layer being the largest bottom stratum, the tactical
layer representing the middle level, and the top strategic layer
representing the executive level (Anthony 1988, Mumford et al.
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Table 4. Differentiated resilience roles at different organizational levels.
 
Operational level Tactical level Strategic level
Leadership fosters persistence through
operational control in daily operations to
ensure that the system has the day-to-day
ability to absorb a magnitude of
disturbances and to anchor essential
services with minimum disruption
Leadership establishes integrated response
capabilities, adaptability through management
control, continuous improvement, and scenario-
based exercises to enable the organization to
adaptively manage risk, to bounce back better,
and to embrace opportunities to bounce forward
Leadership takes a long-term perspective to
transform the organization in a timely manner
through emergent strategic planning to survive and
thrive amid uncertainty while navigating disruptive
change, to intentionally transform its identity toward
a more sustainable development trajectory
2007, Ho 2015). The different interrelated aspects of resilience
(persistence, adaptability, and transformability) can occur at
multiple hierarchical levels in organizations and interact across
temporal, spatial, and hierarchical scales. To foster resilient
essential services, we argue that the primary role of operational
leadership is to foster persistence of core operational functions,
the role of tactical leadership is to develop adaptability, and the
role of strategic leadership is to transform the organization in a
timely manner to survive and thrive amid disruptive change (Fig.
2, Table 4). We also argue that specified resilience is crucial in the
lower strata of organizations while the significance of general
resilience increases higher up. Operational leaders need to be
aware of external threats and mindful of internal vulnerabilities
to persist. In contrast, strategic leaders need to be aware of
external opportunities and mindful of internal well-being of
employees to transform proactively.
Fig. 2. Resilience roles and responsibilities at different
organizational levels.
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO BUILD AND ASSESS
RESILIENCE OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
The framework introduced above can be used to identify different
strategies and interventions to build the resilience of essential
services in different parts of socio-technical supply systems.
Applying the framework at different organizational levels can
facilitate contextually appropriate assessments that help develop
a deeper and shared understanding of the complex adaptive
dynamics of a system in relation to the larger context in which it
is embedded, a key objective of many resilience assessments
(Quinlan et al. 2015). To achieve this objective, we argue that the
assessment process should incorporate key resilience-building
principles of facilitating broad participation, encouraging
learning, and facilitating a deeper understanding of complex
dynamics in the socio-technical system, while building trust and
social capital (Biggs et al. 2015).  
In the following sections, we discuss how the framework can be
applied specifically in the context of socio-technical electricity
supply systems to build and assess resilience. The four resilience
quadrants can be used as a guideline for the differentiated
assessment of respective types of resilience at different
organizational levels. We also suggest indicators of quadrant-
specific resilience applicable to specific organizational levels
(Table 5).
Specified technical resilience
Specified technical resilience represents areas where investments
can be made in identified infrastructure and assets to ensure that
they can withstand specified threats, in answer to “resilience of
what and to what?” (Carpenter et al. 2001, Quinlan et al. 2015:3).
Although the timing and severity of these specified threats may
be unknown, their potential future occurrence can be calculated
probabilistically (O’Connell et al. 2015a). This quadrant draws
on what Holling (1996) described as engineering resilience, or
what is known in the electric utility world as utility resilience,
reliability standards, electric power infrastructure resilience, or
grid resilience (Madni and Jackson 2009, NIAC 2009, Park et al.
2013, DOE 2014, NERC 2015). The specified technical resilience
domain represents level 1 technology solutions that enhance
survivability and robustness (Pavard et al. 2006, Madni and
Jackson 2009, Dahlberg 2015), following the laws of physics and
using reductionist approaches.
Building specified technical resilience
Given adequate resources, infrastructure resilience can be
achieved to withstand anticipated hazards through good practice,
which includes intelligent engineering design that implements
adequate margins of safety, quality construction, and sufficient
maintenance (UNESCAP 2013). In a utility such as Eskom, this
translates into applying engineering standards (for example,
reliability criteria, quality controls, and routine inspections).
Consideration should be given to fail-to-safe design philosophies
(i.e., revert to a safe condition if  it fails). Specified technical
resilience can also be enhanced through a wider distribution of
resources to increase redundancy. An example of increasing
diversity and redundancy in electricity supply is the use of
microgrids around critical facilities or the placement of critical
spares such as spare towers or mobile transformers at select
locations throughout the grid to speed up emergency response.
Assessing specified technical resilience
Specified technical resilience assessments can consist of
quantitative measures (Quinlan et al. 2015), benchmarks, tests,
and compliance with engineering standards and controls applied
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Table 5. Suggested quadrant-specific indicators of resilience at different organizational levels.
 
Type of resilience Indicators of persistence at
operations level




• Infrastructure and assets well
managed to required standards,
including regular maintenance
and tests of back-up




and have efficient access to
operational spares to restore
network disruptions
• Technical standards are adaptively revised to
incorporate learning; adaptive assessment
approaches are applied, and a portfolio of
technical investments exists for disaster risk
reduction (NDMC 2005)
• Strategic spares are available for contingencies
and response (NIAC 2010)
• Engineers consider build-back-better and fail-
to-safe design philosophies (Park et al. 2013,
UNISDR 2015)
• Strategic commitment to invest in
resilience, reserve margins, and self-healing
capabilities (DOE 2014)
• Decision making considers effects of
decisions on resilience of critical processes
(BSI 2014)
• Adopt a modular substation design
strategy; although initial cost is higher, it can
allow standardization on spares and speeds
up recovery (Zolli and Healy 2012, Friedrich
et al. 2015, EPRI 2016)
Specified social
resilience
• Competent in decisions that
require attention to detail and
precision across multiple
recurring iterations†
• Competent in execution of
standard operating procedures,
emergency roles and
responsibilities, ability to execute
preapproved response plans, and
ability to participate effectively
in simulation exercises (Wybo
2008)
• Competent in semistructured decisions and
ensuring efficient and effective use of resources
through business planning, logistics
coordination, and operational improvements†
• Contingency arrangements, response plans,
and risk reduction strategies are systematically
reviewed and adaptively revised to incorporate
learning (Saurin et al. 2013)
• Response structures effectively integrate across
functions
Competent in unstructured decisions that
are complex, ambiguous, and far-reaching in
scope, entail high levels of uncertainty, and
often pertain to nonlinear risks in the
external environment†
• Commitment to resilience through visible
leadership in good-practice disciplines such
as emergency preparedness and business
continuity management
• Ownership of contingency arrangements,
knowing and testing established plans, and
actively participating in emergency
simulation exercises





• Able to operate adaptive
technology under pressure and
maintain back-up and
contingent systems components
• Technical capabilities that allow
operational flexibility often
beyond the infrastructure itself,
e.g., demand response contracts
• Review asset condition monitoring practices
and test results of deployed technologies that
provide adaptive capacity and strengthen
systems flexibility, e.g., unit islanding schemes
and black-start tests performed
• Consider technology solutions beyond the
infrastructure system
• Proactive investment in systems flexibility
(in electricity supply, these include smart
metering, smart grid, containerized mobile




• Monitor whether people feel
empowered to act in the interest
of safety and resilience if
contrary to what is expected
• Able to follow intuition based
on deep experience in situations
that necessitate that rules be
broken
• During extreme events, be
comfortable to apply an incident
command system to perform
emergency operations, even
under great pressure
• Employ fail-to-safe scenarios in
emergency exercises that stretch
people beyond the plan
• Able to network and mobilize support through
strong social networks, third-party agreements,
and memorandums of understanding that have
been established
• Monitor for signs of restorative or retributive
justice exercised in supervision
• Identify heuristics used on the frontline, verify
the validity to formalize and spread guiding
heuristics to be used in crises
• During extreme events, be comfortable to
coordinate planning, be able to integrate
situational awareness during the incident to
provide a common operational picture of
unfolding events, execute tactical command,
mobilize resources, and coordinate logistics to
support operations
• Actively build a culture of resilience and
safety, with restorative justice in word and
deed; the ability to anticipate and avoid
predictable surprises‡
• Evidence that they value and actively build
social and psychological capital in their
networks and through their leadership,
practice adaptive management, and
encourage decentralized self-organization
during disruption (Jones 2011, Pereira and
Ruysenaar 2012, Everly et al. 2013)
• Strengthen external and internal
connections in functions, across disciplines,
and with other sectors (Stephenson 2010)
• During extreme events, be comfortable to
fulfill the incident commander role, be able
to see the big picture, prioritize objectives,
take decisions in spite of incomplete
information, and recognize when a phase
change is evident or a regime shift has taken
place
†See Anthony (1988), Mumford et al. (2007), Ho (2015).
‡See Bazerman and Watkins (2008).
Ecology and Society 23(2): 12
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss2/art12/
throughout the asset life cycle. Reliability assessments contribute
toward technical resilience, but reliability is not enough to ensure
resilience to low-probability high-consequence events (Stockton
2014, Panteli and Mancarella 2015). Because of an increase in
severe weather events due to climate change, the resilience of
technologies already deployed should be monitored (Savonis et
al. 2014) to harden or reinforce existing infrastructure and
modernize aging infrastructure to withstand severe climate events
(Panteli and Mancarella 2015), and reliability design criteria for
infrastructure should be revised to cater for new extremes.  
When infrastructure is damaged in disasters (for example, due to
severe weather), the global Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction suggests that asset owners consider the option to build
back better (UNISDR 2015) to enable “bouncing forward”
(Kelman et al. 2015:22). In addition, adaptive assessment
approaches can be employed to verify the reliability and resilience
of current infrastructure in relation to the increased probability
and intensity of severe weather events. A risk assessment of
climate-resilient infrastructure can identify assets vulnerable to
inundation or structural failure to inform an infrastructure
resilience investment strategy for disaster risk reduction (NDMC
2005). Within Eskom, the systematic application of this approach
is prescribed in the disaster management strategy in the form of
disaster risk assessments and disaster risk reduction. This process
demonstrates the cyclical nature of assessing resilience to build
resilience.
Specified social resilience
Specified social resilience entails specific investments in people
and processes to ensure that they can maintain the continuity of
critical functions when subjected to identified threats. This
quadrant draws on the management disciplines of emergency
management, crisis management, business continuity management,
and safety management, as well as literature from the fields of
organizational resilience, climate resilience, and disaster
management (Linnenluecke and Griffiths 2012, Miao et al. 2013,
Mendonça and Wallace 2015). The adequacy of people’s technical
skills draws on the traditional reductionist approaches of socio-
technical systems thinking and human-machine interface design
(Dekker 2005, Qureshi 2007, Klein 2008). To ensure safety in high-
risk operations, the literature on high-reliability organizations
highlights cultivating resilience mindsets (Weick et al. 1999,
Schulman et al. 2004, Lekka 2011).
Building specified social resilience
Specified social resilience can be built through the adoption of
established disciplines of good practice (BSI 2014). The Eskom
Resilience Programme is based on the adoption of emergency
management, business continuity management, and disaster
management at different scales across the organization, using risk
management as a common basis, and incident management
integrated at the time of response across functional and
geographic boundaries (Koch et al. 2013). Through the adoption
of these management systems, response preparedness and
contingency arrangements are formally established. While these
good-practice guidelines are aimed at specific response
capabilities, the process can also contribute to general social
resilience when people synthesize the wider context and recognize
the purpose of these processes.  
To develop the cognitive ability to deal with the disruption of
extreme events, an effective response capability can be developed,
but there is no substitute for experience (Cilliers 2000, Casto 2014,
Doyle et al. 2015). Operators need the ability to recognize system
failure conditions and arrest the collapse of technical
infrastructure systems. Because real resilience tests seldom occur,
this experience can be built up through being exposed to stretching
scenarios in simulation exercises (Wybo 2008, Koch et al. 2013,
Kellett and Peters 2014). The apprentice program for a new system
operator to autonomously man a desk in Eskom National Control
lasts longer than a decade and includes extensive time on the
simulator. Participation in emergency exercises and simulations
is vital to build and assess resilience (Wybo 2008).  
Continuous learning is a vital resilience-enhancing principle
(Biggs et al. 2012). While incident investigations assess root
causes, they also propose preventive measures. Collectively, these
findings can be useful in facilitating adaptation requirements that
build specified resilience. Highly reliable organizations cultivate
collective mindfulness that pays attention to small signals, for
example, when incidents result in responses at a systemic level that
are outside of the expected norms (Weick et al. 1999). Such
organizations learn from their and others’ mistakes to “fail
forward.” At a wider scale, specified social resilience can be
enhanced by changing the rules of the game such as by redesigning
the regulatory framework to support resilience (NIAC 2010,
Keogh and Cody 2013), increasing the range of options (e.g.,
having critical load specifications for the utility or diversifying
the energy options for customers), and increasing the size of
buffers through energy demand management programs.
Assessing specified social resilience
Specified social resilience assessments can entail a verification of
established preparedness against predefined objectives in the form
of authorized contingency arrangements, response and recovery
plans, and standard operating procedures. Such assessments can
be done based on the guidelines of good-practice disciplines such
as emergency preparedness, business continuity management,
and disaster management. Various indicators of specified social
capabilities have been recommended to enable repeatable and
comparable resilience assessments (McManus et al. 2007,
Stephenson 2010, Lee et al. 2013, Matzenberger et al. 2015).
Within Eskom, divisional and provincial progress is monitored
against key deliverables as part of an enterprise resilience
program. The role of exercises in specified social resilience
assessments is to test execution against these predefined plans and
to verify the effectiveness of the preparedness at a disaggregated
level in organizations. Such integrated provincial and national
exercises are conducted annually in Eskom.
General technical resilience
General technical resilience refers to the generic ability of man-
made systems to withstand any threat or disruption amid the
complexity of the level 2 systems in which they are embedded.
This quadrant draws on network topology, resilience engineering,
systems resilience, systems of systems, and critical infrastructure
systems literature (Hollnagel et al. 2006, Janssen et al. 2006,
Dekker et al. 2008, McDaniels et al. 2008, Gopalakrishnan and
Peeta 2010, Stockton 2014, Amin 2015, Gao et al. 2016). The field
of resilience engineering should be distinguished from
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engineering resilience described by Holling (1996). Resilience
engineering applies a complexity perspective to the safety of man-
made systems by ensuring that the overall socio-technical system
has the capacity to withstand a threat, the flexibility to restructure
itself  in the face of a threat, the tolerance to degrade gracefully
following an encounter with a threat, and the cohesion to operate
before, during, and after an encounter with a threat (Dekker et
al. 2008, Jackson 2008).
Building general technical resilience
Building general technical resilience requires increasing systems-
level flexibility that allows bending rather than breaking
(Longstaff  et al. 2014, Dahlberg 2015). It entails optimizing
network topology for resilience to maintain connectivity amid
disruption, although there can be a trade-off  with network
efficiency (Gutfraind 2012, Gao et al. 2016). General technical
resilience can be strengthened through technology that enables
emergent and adaptive approaches that support novel self-service
capabilities through, for example, built-in fail-to-safe modes and
just-in-case contingency capacities that accommodate systems
failure and manage failure and recovery (Park et al. 2013, Seville
et al. 2015). Measures that increase system adaptation under
system failure conditions include systems-level flexibility,
increased observability and controllability, permeable systems
boundaries that are less brittle under pressure (Rumbaitis del Rio
2015), and tools that support rapid response and recovery
(Schneider and Somers 2006, Francis and Bekera 2014, Panteli
and Mancarella 2015). By extrapolating from resilience in social-
ecological systems, general technical resilience can be enhanced
by paying attention to energy flows, systems-level feedback loops,
slow variables, thresholds, and interdependencies in the system.  
In the electricity industry, general technical resilience is a key
consideration in the focus on smart grid technology. For example,
smart metering enables connectivity with improved information
flow, controllability, and dynamic reconfigurability of the system;
self-healing networks enable technical systems to self-organize
following disruption; and microgrids enable modularity, diversity,
and redundancy (Lacey 2014, Ye 2014, Zarakas et al. 2014).
Regulatory requirements that enable the flexible management of
real-time electricity demand reduction in the event of a range of
scenarios in South Africa include the establishment of critical and
essential load requirements as well as interruptible load contracts
(SABS 2010). General technical resilience can also be built into
communities, for example, by diversifying energy options such as
solar-powered traffic lights to prevent gridlock when power
supply fails and through the use of peak-day pricing, stimulating
energy efficiency that improves peak demand reduction and
contributes to overall systems efficiency.
Assessing general technical resilience
Assessments of general technical resilience need to appraise levels
of general technical resilience of the critical infrastructure system
through an evaluation of the flexibility of the overall system when
under strain or under failure conditions that may not yet be
apparent. Metrics are available for the resilience of complex
networks based on network topology and system dynamics (Zhao
et al. 2011, Gao et al. 2016). Indicators of general technical
resilience identified for socio-technical systems include safety
margins, buffers and levels of redundancy built into the design
and operations of the system (Madni and Jackson 2009). Potential
indicators, inferred from social-ecological systems, include
systems-level connectivity and barriers (Biggs et al. 2015).
Drawing on Cork’s (2011) work on resilient ecosystems, general
resilience indicators applicable to assessment of technical systems
include: modularity in the connections of components in the
network to ensure that the overall system continues to function
even if  one part of the system has collapsed (referred to as
redundancy and diversity by Woods [2005]); tight feedback
mechanisms through which information about change is gathered
and transmitted through the system (referred to as observability
by Savulescu [2014]) to ensure adequate, timely, and scale-
appropriate response (referred to as controllability by Panteli and
Mancarella [2015]), and; levels of just-in-case economic and
system reserves that can be drawn from if  something untoward
happens (Seville et al. 2015).  
The cost of general technical resilience investments is high, and
there is no certainty about when it is enough. We therefore propose
balancing investments in this quadrant with resilience investments
in general social resilience because the uniquely human strength
to adjust and improvise enhances the adaptability of complex
level 2 socio-technical systems (Dekker 2005, Heese et al. 2014).
General social resilience
General social resilience refers to investments in people and
processes to ensure that the overall socio-technical system has
continuity and a general ability to cope with dynamic change in
the face of novel and unanticipated disruptions. This quadrant
focuses on learning to adapt to change, preparing the system for
emergent self-organization, and using complexity leadership
thinking to renew the system should large shocks occur (Comfort
et al. 2001, Marion and Uhl-Bien 2001, Walker et al. 2002,
Kaufmann 2013). This quadrant draws on psychology, behavioral
and social sciences, community resilience literature (DuPlessis
VanBreda 2001, Youssef and Luthans 2007, Armitage et al. 2012,
Carpenter et al. 2012), the fields of ergonomics and human factors
(Qureshi 2007, Klein 2008, Dekker 2012, NIST 2016b), as well as
the side of resilience engineering that helps people who operate
within complex socio-technical systems to cope with complexity
under pressure and endure (Hollnagel et al. 2006, Righi et al.
2015).
Building general social resilience
Eskom has identified five generic social capabilities of a resilient
essential service system, namely: (1) anticipate, identify, and adapt
rapidly to threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities arising from
changes in the internal and external environment; (2) operate at
elevated levels of stress without failure for extended periods of
time; (3) respond rapidly to a shock to contain the impact (severity
and duration) of the event or threat; (4) recover rapidly in a
coordinated manner; and (5) deliberately evolve to a higher state
of resilience in response to changes in the environment by
implementing learning from near misses and incidents (Koch et
al. 2013). These general social resilience capabilities can be
nurtured through investment in social, cultural, and educational
competencies (PwC 2013).  
An organizational culture of resilience can be fostered through
behaviors that help employees to be agile and adaptive in the face
of disruption and change (Luthans et al. 2006, Everly et al. 2013).
Organizations can encourage purposive self-organization (Pavard
et al. 2006, Shaw et al. 2014, De Coning 2016). For instance, a
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standard incident command system offers a flexible and highly
adaptive management system that enables dynamic self-
organization, yet ensures coordination toward common incident
objectives (Maitlis and Christianson 2014). Empowering
leadership that explicitly gives people permission to act in a high-
trust environment (Jones 2011) makes space for personal
commitment that unlocks determination and willpower (Conway
et al. 1974) and can contribute significantly to resilient
organizational response to disruption (Nguyen et al. 2016).
Assessing general social resilience
Sense of coherence has arisen as a significant indicator of
individual and societal resilience (DuPlessis VanBreda 2001,
Almedom et al. 2007, Overland 2011). It refers to how people
make sense of everyday reality and whether they view life and the
world as comprehensible, manageable, and meaningful
(Lindström and Eriksson 2006, Almedom et al. 2007). A healthy
sense of coherence provides the ability to cope with stressful
situations (Eriksson and Lindström 2005); contributes to
preventive, protective, and restorative capacity in people subjected
to disruption; and influences survival and recovery (DuPlessis
VanBreda 2001, Overland 2011). Furthermore, cultivating a
restorative safety culture that is just (rather than retributive)
significantly contributes to resilience because it enables an
organization to learn from mistakes rather than focusing on
attributing blame, which can result in covering up incidents or
tampering with evidence (Dekker and Breakey 2016). Effective
learning processes can be facilitated through adaptive
management (Hummelbrunner and Jones 2013b) and adaptive
governance systems (Folke et al. 2005, Garschagen 2013, Seeliger
and Turok 2014).  
The general social resilience quadrant represents a highly sought-
after resilience advantage but is the most difficult to establish or
assess. Assessments of general social resilience require sense
making that engages with contextual complexity. General
resilience assessment indicators adapted from Cork (2011) include
monitoring for change in: (1) levels of openness in the system for
the movement of people and ideas into, through, and out of the
system; (2) levels of social reserves, and; (3) levels of social and
relational capital such as leadership, networks, community, and
trust exhibited in the system (Pereira and Ruysenaar 2012).
General social resilience can also potentially be assessed by
measuring and monitoring collective sense of coherence (Ghoshal
and Bruch 2003, Lindström and Eriksson 2006); evaluating the
presence and effectiveness of the seven generic principles
proposed by Biggs et al. (2015), and; evaluating the nature of the
culture, informal institutions, and heuristics used to make
judgements under uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974,
North 1991, Pereira and Ruysenaar 2012).
CONCLUSION
The resilience of technologically mediated essential services is
critical to human well-being. These essential services are produced
by complex adaptive socio-technical systems that consist of layers
of critical infrastructure embedded within people and processes
in organizations responsible for delivering these services. Here,
we make a novel contribution by conceptualizing the resilience of
essential services in terms of both specified parts and the whole
of the complex adaptive socio-technical system that produces
essential services. The framework we propose juxtaposes and
distinguishes between specified and general resilience investments
in (1) people and institutions as a social infrastructure investment,
and (2) infrastructure and assets as a technology infrastructure
investment (Fig. 1). This four-quadrant framework provides a
guide to a differentiated but integrated set of resilience strategies
and assessment indicators that can be applied across different
organizational levels.  
We suggest that all four quadrants of the proposed framework
should be applied at all organizational levels. However, the relative
importance of specified and general resilience varies across these
levels: specified resilience is more pertinent at the operational
level, whereas general resilience is more pertinent at the strategic
level (Fig. 2). This difference partly explains why reductionist
approaches have been dominant in considering resilience of
infrastructure systems because the emphasis is on continuity of
technical operations amid disruption. However, as the concept of
resilience thinking matures in essential service provision, we
expect that complex adaptive systems thinking will increasingly
permeate resilience practice. All four dimensions of resilience are
important, but general social resilience in essential service systems
in particular has generally been neglected.  
Specified resilience can be built in a linear fashion based on good
practice, but general resilience needs to be built in an emergent
fashion, drawing on approaches from complex adaptive systems
thinking. Technological resilience investments generally reduce
vulnerability and mitigate failure, whereas social resilience
investments increase available options and enhance collective
adaptability. Both forms of resilience are necessary to safeguard
essential services against systems failure. Both reductionist and
complexity-based approaches to resilience add value and should
be employed in a complementary, rather than competitive or
exclusive, fashion. When either approach is used exclusively, it
might erode resilience.  
We argue that formative resilience assessments can be conducted
for building resilience of essential services based on social and
technical indicators of specified and general resilience. To
stimulate the emergence of social resilience across the system, a
key aspect of formative resilience assessments is identifying and
conducting critical conversations at different organizational
levels. By stimulating appropriate discussions at multiple levels,
resilience assessments can promote adaptation and transformation
of the system and stimulate the emergence of resilience across the
system.  
More work is required to understand the options to assess and
build resilience of socio-technical systems and, in particular, the
social dynamics required to ensure resilient essential service
delivery. Humans can be both the weakest link and the strongest
resource to ensure resilience of essential services. More research
is required on how to build a culture of resilience in key service
providers and to develop and understand techniques that foster
social resilience. Although we have focused on the case of socio-
technical systems, we suggest that the approach we have adopted
in our framework may be useful for advancing thinking and
indicator development in social-ecological systems more broadly,
for instance, by overlaying specified and general resilience against
societies and ecosystems. We suggest that this approach can
support the operationalization of resilience assessments that can
identify and integrate a diverse portfolio of resilience-enhancing
initiatives and investment strategies.
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